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Abstract 
Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a 
group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Critics argue 
that they distort incentives, resulting in lower individual performance, and that the selected pool 
of tournament winners may be inefficient. In this paper, we study the empirical validity of such 
claims in a real-effort pair-wise tournament between children from two similar schools who 
systematically differ in how much training they received ex-ante in the task at hand. Our results 
show that performance was not reduced for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects and that 
it was in fact enhanced. Additionally, while affirmative action balanced the proportion of 
disadvantaged individuals winning their respective tournament, the average performance of the 
pool of winners only decreased slightly.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In many selection processes such as university admissions, job promotions and 
procurement auctions the competition generated serves the important purpose of 
identifying the highest-ability individuals and facilitating the correct allocation of talent 
in society. This objective may not be achieved if some talented individuals are 
discriminated against and do not have the same capacities to compete. For example, 
talented students from poor economic backgrounds may have attended high schools that 
receive less funding, which may affect their SAT performance and hence their 
university admission. Likewise, some individuals may belong to historically 
discriminated groups, and have to overcome major obstacles in order to be on an equal 
footing to compete.  
Affirmative Action policies (AA) have two main objectives: to guarantee that 
positions are fairly allocated in society and to allow for the correct identification of 
talent. AA policies take proactive steps to provide equal opportunities to discriminated 
groups that have a potential disadvantage.2 They are often implemented by biasing 
tournament rules in order to increase the probability of success of a disadvantaged 
group. For example, a fixed lump-sum bonus of 20 (out of 150) points was added to the 
score of minority applicants to the undergraduate program at the University of Michigan 
and a similar but “unofficial lift” scheme is used at many top universities.3 In public 
procurement auctions bid preferences are granted in a multiplicative way. For example, 
road construction contracts in California are auctioned off by granting a 5% reduction of 
the submitted bid to small business enterprises.  
The implementation of AA is usually accompanied by intense public debate 
focusing on whether such policies satisfy certain fairness criteria and on the possible 
incentive distortions they may create. Abstracting from fairness considerations, 
opponents of AA base their criticism on two grounds. First, advantaged individuals may 
be discouraged by the preferential treatment of their (disadvantaged) rivals, leading to 
lower performance. Consequently, disadvantaged individuals may anticipate this 
reaction by their opponents or perceive AA as a substitute for their own effort, also 
                                                 
2 Merriam-Webster Online defines affirmative action as “an active effort to promote the rights or progress 
of minority groups or other disadvantaged persons”. 
3 This procedure was recently ruled to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, due in part to alleged 
distortionary effects on incentives that such compensation may create. State funded universities such as 
California, Florida and Texas have also applied similar measures in the past. 
 3
leading to lower performance.4 Second, opponents argue that the pool of selected 
individuals, that is, the pool of winners, may be of poorer quality since lower-
performing individuals may now be selected. On the other hand, advocates of AA argue 
that leveling the playing field in a competitive environment may have positive effects 
on performance because AA reduces the asymmetry in capacities to compete, which 
increases competitive pressure and therefore enhances performance. 
Surprisingly, both positions fail to base their views on solid empirical findings since 
very little research in economics provides empirical evidence on whether AA improves 
or worsens performance or on how it affects the pool of selected individuals.5 In this 
paper, we present results from a pair-wise real-effort tournament in which there exists a 
naturally induced source of disadvantage for one group of competitors, and where two 
different types of AA policies are implemented to compensate for it.6 
We designed pair-wise tournaments among children from two similar schools which 
differ in how experienced their students are in the real-effort task on which the 
competition is based, i.e., solving simple numerical puzzles known as “sudokus.”7 
Students in one school (“experienced”) are taught how to solve sudokus as part of their 
regular math classes, while students in the other school (“non-experienced”) are not.8 
The schools are very similar in other relevant respects: both are private, fully bilingual 
and have good records in national math and science competitions. Therefore, the 
difference in experience can be regarded as an exogenous source of disadvantage since 
it is most likely not the reason why parents chose one particular school over the other. 
First, we study whether knowing that such an asymmetry in experience exists affects the 
performance of both experienced and non-experienced individuals. To study this 
question we adopt a baseline treatment where no AA is implemented and where subjects 
were unaware of the existence of an asymmetry in experience. We compare the 
                                                 
4 See, for example, the introductory remarks in Sowell (2004) and the discussion in Fryer and Loury 
(2005b) of “Myth No. 3: Affirmative action undercuts investment incentives”. 
5 One exception is Schotter and Weigelt (1992), which we discuss below. Also, see Holzer and Neumark 
(2000) for a survey.  
6 We chose pair-wise tournaments versus multiple-prize tournaments with N players for several reasons. 
First, and most importantly, the schools involved did not want us to establish intra-school competitions. 
Second, we wanted all subjects to be equally uninformed about the possible performance of their rivals. 
Finally, it allows us to relate our results to the existing theoretical models on pair-wise tournaments using 
AA. 
7 Sudoku is a logic-based number-placement puzzle. The objective is to fill a 9x9 grid so that each 
column, each row and each of the nine 3x3 boxes contains one-digit numbers from 1 to 9 only once. The 
puzzle setter provides a partially completed grid. We use a simplified 4x4 grid version in order to obtain 
sufficient variability in performance. 
8 Coate and Loury (1993) show how discrimination may arise in two symmetric groups as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. In our case the asymmetry is exogenously given. 
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respective results with an alternative treatment where the difference in experience is 
made salient. Second, in treatments where subjects are aware of the asymmetry in 
experience, we implement two types of compensation—lump-sum and proportional 
bonuses—designed to equalize on average the probability of non-experienced students 
beating their experienced rivals.9 We then study how performance by students from 
both schools is affected by the implementation of AA and whether the output of the new 
pool of tournament winners differs from the one obtained without any form of 
compensation. 
The closest theoretical papers that explicitly address the incentive effects of 
affirmative action are Fu (2006), Franke (2008), Balart (2009) and Hickman (2009). 
They model affirmative action as a bias in favor of ex-ante disadvantaged players in an 
all-pay auction or contest set-up. Except for Hickman (2009), and in line with the 
simple model we present in Section 3, the conclusion that can be drawn from these 
papers is that reducing asymmetry in competitive advantage tends to enhance individual 
performance.10 Also, Fryer and Loury (2005a) show that optimal affirmative action in 
winner-take-all tournaments should involve handicapping. This result is not restricted to 
the affirmative action framework since similar results were first established for rank-
order tournaments in Lazear and Rosen (1981), or for optimal auctions in Myerson 
(1981), where it is shown that favoring weak players might induce efficient allocations 
or maximization of expected revenue, respectively.11  
There is a large empirical literature on tournaments and specifically on how the size 
of prizes affects competition (see Prendergast (1999) for a survey). With respect to 
affirmative action in tournaments, Niederle et al. (2008) study the effects of quotas on 
tournament participation of women. Miller and Segal (2008) analyze the long-term 
effects of affirmative action on the pool of hired law enforcement officers in the US. 
Finally, in the context of road construction contracts, Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) 
and Marion (2007) show that bid preferences for small businesses, in addition to 
balancing the asymmetry of entrants, induce higher procurement costs because the entry 
decisions of large low-cost firms are distorted. 
                                                 
9 Calsamiglia (2009) shows that an appropriately designed AA policy should equalize rewards to effort 
whenever the set-up affects one of many factors determining individual final welfare.  
10 Hickman (2009) introduces an adapted equilibrium concept to conclude that lump-sum AA measures 
worsen performance in the context of an asymmetric all-pay auction with infinite players and prizes.  
11 Che and Gale (1998) study how in an all-pay auction with asymmetric players  the inclusion of a cap on 
the size of bids may increase both players’ bids. 
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Schotter and Weigelt (1992) study the incentive effects of AA in experimental 
tournaments in a laboratory set-up where effort exertion is modeled as an individual 
decision problem based on monetary costs. Subjects’ exogenous disadvantage is 
induced by assigning different cost parameters for which individuals are later 
compensated by affirmative action. This procedure makes it possible to vary the size of 
the asymmetry and tailor the compensations in order to exactly level the playing field. 
In line with the theoretical predictions in Section 3, the results obtained indicate that AA 
can either boost or worsen performance depending on the sizes of the cost disadvantage 
and the compensation implemented. In our study, the incentive effects of AA policies 
are analyzed in a real-effort tournament where the asymmetry between subjects existed 
ex-ante and was not induced by the experimentalist. Since we did not have an exact ex-
ante measure of the size of the asymmetry, we relied on results from pilot experiments 
to roughly calculate two different types (and sizes) of compensations, which on average 
level the playing field.12  
The subjects in our experiment were school children. They were unaware that their 
choices were the object of a study since the experiment was presented as an extra-
curricular activity of a type not uncommon in the schools we selected. Using children as 
subjects has additional advantages: they react very spontaneously in competitive 
situations; their performance is not affected by them questioning the underlying 
motivation of the experimentalist; and it is relatively easy to provide them with 
incentives. It has also been shown that children react rationally and in line with 
economic theory (see Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Harbaugh and Krause (2000)). Finally, 
studying how children react to affirmative action is important since many social 
asymmetries may be ideally resolved at these early ages, before they are exacerbated.13 
The experimental results of our study suggest that the implementation of AA 
policies does not necessarily have an adverse effect on the performance of affected 
individuals. First, we find that knowledge of the existence of an asymmetry in ability in 
fact increases performance. Most importantly, when such asymmetry is corrected 
through AA policies, performance by both advantaged (experienced) and disadvantaged 
(non-experienced) individuals increases even more. We show that increases in 
                                                 
12 Several recent experimental studies employ similar strategies based on naturally occurring differences 
in characteristics among social groups. Examples are Hoff and Pandey (2006), where social caste 
differences are exploited, as well as Gneezy et al. (2003), and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), where the 
performance of women versus men and their respective propensity to compete in mixed-gender 
tournaments is analyzed. Niederle et al. (2008) combine this insight on gender differences with 
participation decisions by individuals in an affirmative-action framework based on gender quotas. 
13 Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) show that boys and girls react differently to competition at a young age. 
 6
performance differ depending on individual level of ability. In particular, non-
experienced individuals with relatively higher ability and experienced individuals with 
relatively lower ability exhibit the largest increases in performance, which may be 
explained by the fact that they are the ones most directly affected by the implementation 
of AA. We also find that AA affects boys and girls differently depending on their 
ability, and that it positively increases the confidence in winning of non-experienced 
subjects, while that of experienced subjects is unaffected. Finally, we show that the 
average performance of tournament winners selected through AA is only marginally 
lower than the average performance of the winners who would have been selected 
without it.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Experimental design and 
procedures are explained in Section 2. Section 3 describes a theoretical model that 
illustrates the effects that the type and extent of affirmative-action policies may have on 
performance. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 sums up our conclusions. The 
Appendix contains the instructions used in the experiment. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures  
 
 We conducted pair-wise tournaments among 337 school children, aged 10-13, 
from two similar non-religious, bilingual private schools located in the same upper-class 
neighborhood of Barcelona. Students at both schools have a systematic difference in 
experience of a specific real-effort task consisting in solving simple “sudokus”. This ex-
ante difference in experience is due to the fact that during regular math classes, students 
in the “experienced” school (E) are trained in solving sudokus (and in fact have to solve 
sudokus as part of their regular homework) while students at the “non-experienced” 
school (NE) are not.14  
    Each student from E was randomly and anonymously matched with a student 
from NE in his or her same school year (4th or 6th grade). Each pair competed in a 
tournament that lasted 30 minutes. Subjects had to solve as many simple 4x4 sudokus as 
possible correctly in order to beat their matched rival. To do so, a whole grid had to be 
filled in with numbers from 1 to 4 in such a way that the same number could only 
appear once in each column, row or box in the grid. We chose this task because the 
                                                 
14 An ex-post experimental questionnaire showed that some students from both schools were familiar with 
sudokus due to private experience. In fact, results from pilot experiments, in addition to the present one, 
show that subjects from NE were in fact disadvantaged in the competition (see section 4.1). The task was 
defined as “filling in a grid” and the word “sudoku” was never mentioned.  
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rules are simple, yet it requires substantive logical reasoning and concentration by the 
subjects. Additionally, performance is easy to measure and, crucially, depends on effort. 
Most importantly, both effort and ability play a role, so that non-experienced subjects 
still have a chance of winning, independently of whether they are favored by an 
affirmative action policy or not.15  
 All subjects were handed the same answer sheet containing 96 sudokus 
randomly generated with the same level of difficulty by a computer program.16 Figure 1 
below shows one of the sudokus used in the experiment (a) and its solution (b). 
 
        
(a)  Unsolved Sudoku                                              (b)  Correctly Solved Sudoku 
Figure 1: An example of the real-effort task (sudoku). 
 
 Each pair of subjects was competing for a 7€ (euro) voucher from a bookshop 
located in Barcelona.17 In each pair, the student who had correctly solved more sudokus 
during a 30 minute period won the voucher. In the case of ties, the winner was decided 
randomly. 
 Our objective was to study: 1) the effect of providing information on 
competitors’ previous experience with the task and 2) the effect of implementing 
affirmative action policies on subjects’ performance and as a result, on the output 
generated by subjects selected as tournament winners. Thus we randomly assigned 
similar numbers of subjects from each school to each of six treatments. In treatment NK 
no subject was informed about whether subjects from the other school were experienced 
or not in solving sudokus. In treatment K students at the NE school were told that 
                                                 
15 In fact, the percentage of NE winners in their respective tournament was at least 13.3% (for 
experimental treatment “K” and 4th year students, where no affirmative action was implemented). 
16 The software used was “SuDoku Pro” by Dualogy Systems. The proportion of mistakes across all 
solved sudokus was similar. No subject was able to complete all 96 sudokus provided. 
17 Subjects were explicitly told that the voucher was redeemable for “books, collector’s cards, toys, music 
or comics”. Experiments took place at approximately the time the final Harry Potter book was published 
in Spain. 
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students in the E school had previous experience in solving sudokus. Similarly, students 
in the E school were told that students at the NE school were not taught how to solve 
sudokus. In the remaining four treatments all subjects were informed about the 
difference in experience across schools and about the particular affirmative action 
policy applied to NE subjects. In treatments LH (Lump-sum High) and LL (Lump-sum 
Low), NE subjects were given a predetermined number of solved sudokus ex-ante: 20 in 
LH and 8 in LL. In treatments PH (Proportional High) and PL (Proportional Low), NE 
subjects were given a number of solved sudokus proportional to the number of sudokus 
they correctly solved, one for every correctly solved one in the case of PH, and one for 
every two correctly solved ones in the case of PL. Comparisons across treatments NK 
and K allow us to study the effects of information when no affirmative action policies 
are implemented. Since, contrary to our expectations and as we shall show below, we 
did not find significant differences across all treatments where affirmative action is 
implemented (LL, LH, PL, PH), we shall pool the data from such treatments and refer to 
them generically as the “AA treatment”. Table 1 summarizes our treatment design. 
Comparisons across treatments K and AA allow us to study the effect on performance 
of applying affirmative action policies once the asymmetry in experience is known. 
 The sizes of the affirmative action policies were determined using results from 
pilot experiments. Since we were unaware of the exact size of the asymmetry between 
groups, we opted to choose two different sizes of each AA policy so that we could 
potentially observe how different sizes affect performance. At the same time, the 
objective was to design compensations that would on average equalize the chances of 
winning once the subjects reacted to the applied affirmative action policies. As shown 
below, on average the implemented policies roughly induced a “level playing field” ex-
post (49% of subjects from the NE school actually won their respective tournaments).  
 
Table 1: Description of Treatments 
Not Know NK Subjects unaware of others’ experience 
Know K Subjects aware of others’ experience 
Lump-sum High LH Subjects aware of experience and NE subjects receive a bonus of 20 correct sudokus bonus 
Lump-sum Low LL Subjects aware of experience and NE subjects receive a bonus of 8 correct sudokus bonus 
Proportional High PH Subjects aware of experience and NE subjects receive 1 correct sudoku bonus for every 1 correct 
Proportional Low PL Subjects aware of experience and NE subjects receive 1 correct sudoku bonus for every 2 correct 
  
 Prior to conducting the experiments, we repeatedly met with faculty from both 
schools in order to guarantee their collaboration and pedagogical interest in the project. 
During these meetings we obtained information on subjects’ gender, birth date, teaching 
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group and school grades. We later assigned subjects to treatments in such a way that the 
groups were balanced in accordance with these pre-specified characteristics. Table 2 
below shows descriptive statistics of subjects assigned to each treatment at each 
school.18 Small variations across treatments were mainly due to absent students and 
latecomers.    
 
Table 2: Description of the Subject Pool 
 Experienced Non-experienced 
 NK K LH LL PH PL NK K LH LL PH PL 
% Female 41 43 48 47 50 50 46 46 48 39 48 47 
% 6th Year 48 43 45 46 46 47 50 46 59 47 48 59 
Average Math Grade 3.00 3.13 3.29 3.20 2.86 3.09 3.42 3.50 3.54 3.52 3.52 3.47 
Number of subjects 29 30 31 30 28 32 24 24 27 23 27 32 
Note: Average Math Grade is measured on a scale from 0 to 5. 
 
 Subjects were unaware of their participation in an experiment. With the help 
of each school faculty, it was explained to the subjects that this was an extracurricular 
activity, not dissimilar to previous ones carried out during the same school year. 
Participation was quasi-mandatory, which helped to avoid selection biases and 
simplified matters for the school. None of the subjects manifested opposition to 
participating. 
 Experiments were carried out on two separate but close dates at the two 
schools. In each school experimental sessions took place at different times of the day for 
4th and 6th graders for practical reasons.19 Once subjects arrived at their school, they 
were conducted to separate classrooms according to our predefined assignment. While 
students waited for the experimentalist, teachers conducted a specific and identical 
school activity (writing an essay) in order to keep the subjects calm and equally 
uninformed about the experiment. The same experimentalist arrived at each of the 
classrooms at twenty-minute intervals and then sessions started. Teachers were not 
present during the experimental sessions, in order to minimize their influence.20 
                                                 
18 Average Math Grade is slightly higher at the NE school than at the E school. The average math grade at 
the E school is 3.1 while at the NE school it is 3.49, which is significantly different at the 1% level.  
Notice, however, that this is not necessarily an indicator of NE students being better at math, since the 
grading methodology may differ across schools and, in fact, grades in all other topics are also higher at 
the NE school. 
19 We are unaware of cross-contamination between schools or between subjects from different school 
years at the same school. The timing of the experiments was carefully designed so as to avoid these 
problems. 
20 This was the reason different treatments were carried out at different time-intervals. Since the 
experiment deals with effort motivation and children may be easily influenced, it was crucial to have the 
same experimentalist conducting the sessions. The experimentalist rehearsed repeating exactly the same 
cues across sessions. 
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 The experimental sessions lasted one hour. First, the experimentalist read out 
general instructions on how to solve sudokus (see “Pre-instructions” in the Appendix). 
Then, subjects had a five-minute practice round to solve sudokus. After this period, the 
experimentalist solved one of the practice sudokus in front of the students. Once 
questions were clarified, instructions for each of the treatments were read out. The 
instructions made it clear that each student was competing against an anonymous 
student from another comparable school and that students at the other school were 
systematically experienced (or not) in solving sudokus (for treatment NK this 
information was omitted). This difference in ex-ante experience was explicitly 
mentioned and was used to justify the implementation of the affirmative action bias in 
favour of the non-experienced group in treatments LL, LH, PL, and PH (see the 
Appendix for the instructions for one of these treatments). Tournament rules were 
explained giving numerical examples (specific to each treatment) for all potential 
outcomes of the tournament, i.e., losing, winning, and tying. Moreover, aggregate 
information with respect to the number of sudokus (i.e., mean, minimum and 
maximum) that had been correctly solved  by a comparable subject pool was provided. 
This information, identical for all subjects, was based on the results of our pilot 
experiments. The experimentalist also held up a 7€ voucher to increase the credibility of 
the prize offered to tournament winners. After that, subjects had thirty minutes in which 
to solve the sudokus in two separate handouts. After the first fifteen minutes, subjects 
were instructed to start working on the second handout, so that we could measure 
whether there were intra-session learning effects or whether these were over-ruled by 
fatigue.21 Subjects were explicitly told that they could stop solving sudokus and start 
any other activity, such as drawing, so long as they kept quiet and did not bother others.  
After the thirty minutes had passed, the handouts were collected and a questionnaire 
about previous experience in solving sudokus, self-confidence measures and the 
perceived justice behind affirmative action policies was distributed. Once the 
questionnaires had been filled in, subjects continued with their regular classes. The 
experimentalists then randomly matched participants from both schools, determined the 
winners and deposited the vouchers at the schools, to be distributed by school faculty.  
 
 
                                                 
21 We did not find important differences in performance between the two parts of the test, indicating that 
the effects of learning and fatigue possibly cancel out. Experienced subjects completed one more sudoku 
in the second part (significant at the 1% level). Non-experienced subjects did not solve a significantly 
different number of sudokus in the two parts. 
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3. Theoretical Model 
 
We here abstract from psychological aspects and present a stylized non-
cooperative tournament model to illustrate how in the context of pair-wise tournaments 
the existence of an asymmetry in capacity to compete leads to poor performance and 
how both advantaged and disadvantaged individuals may be affected by different AA 
policies.22 Results crucially depend on the relative size of the asymmetry and the 
compensation implemented.23  
The model is based on a simple two-player rank-order tournament as presented 
in Schotter and Weigelt (1992), which is a simplified version of Lazear and Rosen 
(1981). The set-up is as follows: two heterogeneous players i=1,2 compete for a given 
prize with common value V by exerting non-negative effort e1, e2. Heterogeneity affects 
the cost function and is due to some sort of disadvantage for the second player. In 
particular we assume that c1(e1) 1/2  e12 , whilec2(e2) 1/2  b  e22 where b>1.24  
Exerted effort by an agent is  unobservable but generates observable output 
yi=ei+εi for i=1,2 where εi is a random variable which is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between –a and a. The decisive variable for the outcome of the tournament 
is output, i.e. only the agent with the highest output level will win the tournament and 
obtain the prize. Hence, the expected payoff for agents 1 and 2 in a tournament with 
affirmative action can be stated in the following way: 
2
])()(Pr[
2
1
22111
eVAAeyey   and 
2
)](1)(Pr[
2
2
1222
ebVeyAAey  , 
where the affirmative action policy is captured by AA and can take one of the following 
two forms: 
1. Lump-sum AA, with AA = L, where L is a positive constant. 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2008) for evidence on how psychological aspects 
may affect tournament performance in a natural setting. 
23 The model differs from the experimental design in that, in our experiment, neither the tournament 
designers nor the competitors were aware of the size of the asymmetry since some had never been 
exposed to the task before and therefore did not know the extent of the advantage for experienced 
subjects. 
24 Alternatively, the asymmetry can affect the productivity of effort (how effort converts into output) 
without altering qualitative results. 
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2. Proportional AA, with AA = P*e2 , where P is a positive constant.25 
 
The probability of winning for agent 1 can be reformulated as Pr(ε2-ε1<e1-e2-AA). 
Note that the composed random variable ε=(ε2-ε1) has a triangular distribution with the 
following distribution function:  
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The respective distribution function for agent 2 is: )(1)( 12 xFxF  . 
In the interior equilibrium, the effort levels (e1*, e2*) will satisfy the following 
first order conditions for both individuals: 
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The equilibrium effort levels will thus depend on the format of the Affirmative 
Action policy. We now describe the equilibrium for each of the two designs. 
 
Lump-sum AA 
When affirmative action is lump-sum we obtain: 
                         
F1(e1*  e2*  L)
e1

1
2a
 e1
*  e2*  L
4a2
,  for e1
*  e2*  L  0
1
2a
 e1
*  e2*  L
4a2
,  for e1
*  e2*  L  0



, 
and vice versa for the second agent. Using these expressions and solving for e1* and e2* 
in the first order conditions we find that: 
                                  
e1
*  be2*,   e2*  (2a L)V4a2b  (b 1)V ,  for L 
(b 1)V
2ab
 
e1
*  be2*,   e2*  (2a L)V4a2b  (b 1)V ,  for L 
(b 1)V
2ab
. 
We now analyze the effect of AA on the effort levels exerted on equilibrium. 
Comparative statics are carried out by taking derivatives of equilibrium effort levels 
with respect to AA, that is, with respect to L. Equilibrium effort levels first increase in 
                                                 
25 An alternative specification of proportional AA would be to scale up output y2 by factor (1+P), i.e., 
f(e2)=(1+P)(e2+ε2). In this case the random error would also be affected by AA, which complicates the 
analysis but leads to the same qualitative results. 
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the size of the bonus, until a maximum is reached when L  (b 1)V
2ab
, and then 
decrease.26 This implies that the implementation of AA provides incentives to both 
agents so long as the bonus is not too high, in which case the advantage is reversed and 
incentives are reduced. That is, if the bonus helps to reduce the asymmetry then it 
increases incentives, but if it is too large it can reverse the advantage and reduce 
incentives again.27 
Proportional AA 
 
Under proportional affirmative action the marginal probability of winning can be 
expressed as: 
F1(e1*  (1 P)e2*)
e1

1
2a
 e1
*  (1 P)e2*
4a2
,  for e1
*  (1 P)e2*  0
1
2a
 e1
*  (1 P)e2*
4a2
,  for e1
*  (1 P)e2*  0



, 
while for agent 2 the equation is now slightly different: 
 
F2(e1*  (1 P)e2*)
e2

1 P
2a
 (1 P)[e1
*  (1 P)e2*]
4a2
,  for e1
*  (1 P)e2*  0
1 P
2a
 (1 P)[e1
*  (1 P)e2*]
4a2
,  for e1
*  (1 P)e2*  0



. 
 
Using these expressions and solving the first order conditions we find e1* and 
e2*: 
e1
*  b
1 P e2
*,   e2
*  2a(1 P)V
4a2b  ((1 P)2  b)V ,  for P  b 1 
e1
*  b
1 P e2
*,   e2
*  2a(1 P)V
4a2b  (b  (1 P)2)V ,  for P  b 1 
. 
 
                                                 
26 The derivative of e2* with respect to L is de2
*
dL
 V
4a2b (b 1)V  0, for L 
(b1)V
2ab
 and 
de2
*
dL
 V
4a2b (b1)V  0, for L 
(b1)V
2ab
. 
27 Schotter and Weigelt (1992) report that lump-sum Affirmative Action theoretically reduces effort, but 
this is because they only considered the case in which the compensation is relatively large, i.e., 
ab
VbL
2
)1(  . 
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Again, carrying out comparative statics of equilibrium effort levels on the size of 
the AA policy, P, we find that for low levels of proportional bonus, 1P  b , the 
equilibrium effort levels increase with the size of the bonus. But if the bonus is 
high,P  b 1, increasing it further will decrease e1* and have ambiguous effects on 
e2*. 28 As before, there exists a threshold value of P  b 1 which maximizes total 
effort and corresponds to the P which makes the competition exactly level. 
To summarize, we find that affirmative action should increase the subjects’ 
performance, no matter whether the compensation is lump-sum or proportional to 
performance, as long as the bonus reduces the asymmetry, that is, if it is not too large to 
induce reversed discrimination. Our experiment should not be understood as an attempt 
to test the predictive power of this simple and stylized theoretical model empirically. 
Rather, the model serves as an illustration of the potential effects which different types 
and sizes of affirmative action policies might possibly have.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
We start by taking a descriptive look at the data. Table 3 records the average number 
of correct sudokus by treatment and school year (4th or 6th grade) in each of the schools 
(E and NE). Note that there is high heterogeneity in performance in all treatments and 
thus, standard deviations are large. Table 3 provides a first indication that subjects from 
the experienced school (E) solve, on average, more sudokus, a key hypothesis justifying 
our experimental design. It also shows that subjects in more advanced grades perform 
better. Note that the average performance of 4th grade experienced subjects in all 
treatments is similar to that of 6th grade non-experienced subjects.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
28 For P  b 1, e1*
P  
4ab(1 P)V 2
(4a2b (b (1 P)2)V )2  0
 and e2*
P 
1
b
(1 P)e1
*
P 
1
b
e1
*, which has an 
ambiguous sign. For P  b 1, e1*
P  
4ab(1 P)V 2
(4a2b (b (1 P)2)V )2  0
, and e2*
P 
1
b
(1 P)e1
*
P 
1
b
e1
*  0 . 
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Table 3: Average Number (and Standard Deviations) of Correct Sudokus by Treatment and School Year 
4th Grade 6th Grade Overall  
E NE E NE E NE 
NK 28 
(15.43) 
16.98 
(8.01)) 
38.92 
(16.10) 
24.66 
(15.43) 
33.27 
(16.44) 
20.38 
(12.80) 
K 29.94 
(12.45) 
17.69 
(10.70) 
43 
(17.97) 
29.09 
(13.43) 
35.60 
(16.21) 
22.92 
(13.13) 
AA 29.18 
(13.74) 
19.26 
(9.48) 
45.47 
(12.06) 
28.08 
(12.12) 
36.59 
(15.29) 
24.03 
(11.80) 
LH 28.47 
(11.89) 
23.36 
(9.19) 
44.29 
(11.86) 
29.50 
(14.43) 
35.67 
(14.19) 
27 
(12.73) 
LL 27.47 
(12.21) 
19.41 
(11.79) 
51.38 
(11.19) 
26 
(9.01) 
37.83 
(16.71) 
22.56 
(10.85) 
PH 29.60 
(12.45) 
17.92 
(9.05) 
44.69 
(11.09) 
26.53 
(11.15) 
37.54 
(14.50) 
22.07 
(10.84) 
PL 31.23 
(18.22) 
17.07 
(7.59) 
40.27 
(12.38) 
29.16 
(12.83) 
35.47 
(16.17) 
24.25 
(12.42) 
 
Figure 2 below shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number 
of correct sudokus solved by students in the E and NE school for the two treatments 
where AA measures are not implemented (NK and K). Note that the distributions have a 
large spread and range from 0 sudokus solved to more than 70. Stochastic dominance of 
the CDFs for the E school clearly shows that the lower level of experience in solving 
sudokus is in fact a disadvantage for the NE subjects. Mann-Whitney tests comparing 
the inter-school number of correct sudokus in both of these treatments show significant 
differences at the 1% level (p-values of 0.002 for NK and of 0.003 for K). 
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Figure 2: CDFs of the number of correct sudokus by E and NE in the NK and K treatments. 
 
 Intra-school comparisons across treatments are less clear-cut. Table 3 records the 
number of correctly solved sudokus both for the unpooled data for the treatments where 
affirmative action is implemented (LH, LL, PH and PL), and for the pooled data 
included under the AA label. Figure 3 depicts the CDFs for the number of correct 
sudokus for the NK, K and AA treatments in each of the two schools. Visually, the CDF 
for the K treatment “almost stochastically dominates” the CDF for the NK treatment in 
both graphs, suggesting that the provision of information on the existence of a 
disadvantaged group does not decrease performance, and in fact it may enhance it. 
Similarly, the CDFs for the AA treatment also lies below the CDFs for the NK 
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treatment and generally not above the CDF for the K treatment in both schools, 
suggesting that subjects faced with AA policies do not decrease their performance, even 
in the case of the K treatment where they are aware of the disadvantage. Mann-Whitney 
tests comparing the distribution of all treatments do not generally show significant 
differences at the standard levels, apart from the comparison of NK with AA for 6th year 
experienced subjects (average of 38.92 correct sudokus in NK and average of 45.47 in 
AA, p-value of 0.03). 
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Figure 3: CDFs of the number of correct sudokus by school in the NK, K and AA treatments. 
 
The joint Kruskal-Wallis test, as well as Mann-Whitney tests comparing the 
distribution of correctly solved sudokus in all four treatments where affirmative action 
is implemented (LH, LL, PH and PL), do not show statistically significant differences at 
the usual levels which, together with a graphical analysis using CDFs for all four 
treatments, supports the conclusion that different affirmative action policies (and sizes) 
did not have different effects on performance. Note that with respect to our theoretical 
model this may be interpreted as evidence that none of the compensations we used, no 
matter how high they seemed in our pilot experiments, were high enough to reverse the 
asymmetry between the two schools so as to reduce performance by subjects. 
Additionally, the theoretical model predicts similar effects for either lump-sum or 
proportional compensation. Therefore, in the following, we perform our analysis with 
both pooled and unpooled data for those treatments in which affirmative action is 
implemented. 
Low levels of significance can be attributed to the high variance among the 
subjects in a given school. But part of this variance can be attributed to individual 
heterogeneity which we control for in the following section. 
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4.2 The Effects of Information and Affirmative Action on Performance 
 
In this section we study the effects of providing information on the ex-ante 
difference in experience between subjects and how performance in the tournament is 
affected by the implementation of AA policies, using suitable controls for individual 
heterogeneity. We run separate linear regressions for each school with the number of 
correctly solved sudokus as a dependent variable (Table 4). Our baseline treatment is K, 
where subjects are aware of the existing disadvantage but no AA policy is implemented. 
Explanatory variables are the AA treatment dummies (both unpooled and pooled in two 
separate regressions) and a dummy variable for treatment NK in order to control for the 
effect of not providing information on the asymmetry in experience. From the 
theoretical model presented above, differences in ability to compete should affect 
performance, independently of their potential source. Therefore, an important variable 
we need to control for is unobserved “ability”. For a proxy we used the number of 
correct sudokus solved by subjects in a “Pretest”, i.e., the five minute practice rounds 
that subjects performed before the competition was introduced. Additional regressors 
include several other individual characteristics such as “Gender”, year of schooling 
(“Year”), and the math grade obtained by students in the previous term (“Grade”).29 
Since we anticipated that AA may affect subjects differently depending on their level of 
ability, we included an interaction term (“AA*Pretest”). The inclusion of the interaction 
term implies that a representative subject of the base group under K has low ability 
(zero correct sudokus in the five minute trials). The regressions presented in table 4 
show the results for both E and NE schools when controlling for the different AA 
treatments, pooled in the case of OLS (1) and (3) and unpooled in OLS (2) and (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Since “Pretest” and “Grade” may be interpreted as different but correlated measures of individual 
ability, we run separate regressions using just one variable as regressor. Qualitative results are maintained 
and statistical levels of significance are slightly improved. 
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Table 4: Correct Sudokus, Information and Affirmative Action 
 Experienced Non-Experienced 
 OLS (1) 
Dep. Var:  
# Correct Sudokus 
OLS (2) 
Dep. Var:  
# Correct Sudokus 
OLS (3) 
Dep. Var:  
# Correct Sudokus 
OLS (4) 
Dep. Var:  
# Correct Sudokus 
Constant -12.96 
(4.43)*** 
-13.12 
(4.42)*** 
5.16 
(3.29) 
5.22 
(3.34) 
NK 2.73 
(2.49) 
2.75 
(2.49) 
0.40 
(2.15) 
0.40 
(2.19) 
AA 8.31 
(4.80)* 
- -1.59 
(2.68) 
- 
AA*Pretest -1.64 
(0.96)* 
- 1.45 
(0.56)** 
  - 
LH - 11.10 
(5.96)* 
- -3.83 
(4.10) 
LL - -1.66 
(8.19) 
- -2.01 
(4.02) 
PH - 13.38 
(6.02)** 
- -0.38 
(3.55) 
PL - 1.39 
(7.20) 
- -0.66 
(3.51) 
LH*Pretest - -2.29 
(1.24)* 
- 2.12 
(0.88)** 
LL*Pretest - 0.31 
(1.62) 
- 1.58 
(1.03) 
PH*Pretest - -2.17 
(1.23)* 
- 1.01 
(0.87) 
PL*Pretest - -0.58 
(1.45) 
- 1.12 
(0.81) 
Pretest 
(0=Min, 6=Max in E) 
(0=Min, 12=Max in NE) 
6.96 
(0.81)*** 
6.95 
(0.81)*** 
3.34 
(0.42)*** 
3.34 
(0.43)*** 
Grade 
(1=Worst,5=Best) 
3.33 
(0.72)*** 
3.43 
(0.72)*** 
0.45 
(0.70) 
0.45 
(0.71) 
Year 
(0=4th,1=6th) 
12.03 
(1.63)*** 
11.77 
(1.65)*** 
4.14 
(1.24)*** 
4.28 
(1.28)*** 
Gender 
(0=Male,1=Female) 
1.99 
(1.40) 
2.05 
(1.41) 
1.04 
(1.19) 
0.76 
(1.25) 
# Observations 180 180 155a 155a 
Adj. R2 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.64 
       Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. 
(a): For one non-experienced subject “Grade” was not available. Another subject arrived late and did not participate in the               
practice rounds. Such observations are omitted from OLS (3) and OLS (4). 
 
 
Our proxy for unobserved ability as measured by results in the practice rounds 
(“Pretest”), being in sixth grade instead of fourth grade (“Year”), and math grades 
(“Grade”) have all positive and significant effects,30 while the effect of “Gender” is not 
significant. Note that the coefficients for the NK dummy variable are not significant in 
any of the regressions which, together with Figure 3, allows us to conclude:  
 
Result 1: Knowledge of the existence of an asymmetry in experience does not decrease 
performance by experienced or non-experienced subjects. 
 
                                                 
30 “Grade” is not statistically significant for NE subjects. 
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We now focus on the effect of affirmative action on performance, starting with 
the experienced subjects (E). OLS (1) shows that when pooling all affirmative action 
treatments,  the coefficient for AA has a positive and significant impact (at the 10% 
level), i.e., experienced subjects in the base group (with low ability) statistically solve 
8.31 sudokus more if they compete with subjects favored by an affirmative action 
policy. However, the higher the ability of the experienced subject (measured by 
“Pretest”), the  lower the increase in AA performance, since the interaction term 
(“AA*Pretest”) is negative and significant (at the 10% level).31 For subjects with the 
highest ability the performance-enhancing effects of AA are nullified or even slightly 
negative.32 This result suggests that those experienced subjects who realize that they 
may now not win their respective tournament once non-experienced subjects are 
receiving help, are precisely the ones who react most strongly to competitive pressure. 
On the other hand, experienced subjects with high ability may have fewer reasons to 
react, since they may win their respective tournament anyway. The unpooled analysis of 
the AA treatments in OLS (2) generally shows the same signs (apart from the highly 
non-significant LL treatment) although significance is low, which may partially be due 
to the lower sample size. In any case, the more intensive AA treatments, i.e. LH and 
PH, are the main contributors to the described incentive effects. We thus conclude: 
 
Result 2: Affirmative Action policies enhance the performance of experienced subjects. 
The lower the individual ability of the experienced subject, the higher this effect. 
 
We now focus on the non-experienced subjects (NE). Note that as before, the 
inclusion of the interaction term (“AA*Pretest”) implies that a subject in the base group 
has low ability. For the pooled data (OLS (3)) the coefficient of “AA” for low ability 
subjects is negative although not statistically significant from zero. Hence, low ability 
subjects do not react to AA, i.e. AA on its own does not reduce the performance of non-
                                                 
31 The statistical effect of AA on subjects with higher ability can therefore be calculated as 
“AA”+“AA*Pretest”. 
32  We did not anticipate that experienced subjects would solve more than 6 sudokus in their 5 minute 
practice rounds. Thus, experienced subjects were provided with only 6 sudokus as part of their trial. Forty 
percent of the subjects solved all 6 correctly. For this reason our measure of ability for experienced 
subjects is cut off at 6, since it includes individuals who would possibly have solved more than 6 sudokus. 
We thus expect that our estimated parameters are smaller and less significant (due to higher variance) in 
comparison to properly specified trials with a larger number of sudokus. For the subsequently run 
experimental sessions with non-experienced subjects, we extended the number of trial sudokus to 12. By 
truncating these data artificially in the same manner as for experienced subjects, we were able to verify 
the conjecture that results become slightly less significant and weaker in absolute size without altering the 
qualitative results when there are fewer sudokus in practice rounds. 
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experienced subjects with low ability. This result is substantively different for subjects 
with higher abilities as shown by the positive and significant coefficient at the 5% level 
of the interaction term (“AA*Pretest”): subjects with higher ability solve significantly 
more sudokus with AA than without it, i.e. each extra correct sudoku in the practice 
round implies 1.45 more correct sudokus in the tournament if AA is implemented.33 We 
thus conclude: 
 
Result 3: Affirmative Action policies do not decrease the performance of non-
experienced subjects. In fact, AA increases the performance of these subjects with the 
exception of those of  lowest ability. The higher the ability of the non-experienced 
subject, the greater the impact of  this performance-enhancing effect.  
 
The results obtained for the non-experienced subjects are in contrast to those for 
experienced subjects. While low ability subjects without experience are not affected by 
AA, high ability subjects without experience tend to react very positively to AA. For 
experienced subjects this relation is reversed. This difference in behavior is intuitive 
because non-experienced subjects with high ability and experienced subjects with low 
ability are those most affected by the implementation of AA. They are at the margin of 
competition and thus they are most directly affected by the level playing field imposed 
through AA. The results for the separate AA treatments in OLS (4) are similar in 
direction but mainly non-significant.34 For non-experienced subjects this conclusion is 
also verified by analyzing the results of a similar linear regression where the dependent 
variable is the number of wrongly solved sudokus. Here, low ability students have a 
significantly lower number of wrongly solved sudokus under AA. This effect decreases 
for students with higher abilities.35 
There exists an important literature analyzing how male and female individuals 
react differently to competition (see Gneezy et al. (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) 
and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). We here run regressions that control for gender 
                                                 
33 Note that non-experienced subjects were able to solve up to 12 sudokus in the pretest, which implies 
that the performance-enhancing effect of AA, as expressed by the interaction term “AA*Pretest”, is 
important. For instance, a subject with 11 correct sudokus in the pretest (the highest observed value in the 
experiment) would statistically solve 14.4 (=-1.59+11*1.45) more sudokus in the tournament with AA 
than without it.  
34 Again, the reason for the low significance of the AA-treatment dummies in OLS (4) in comparison to 
the pooled treatment AA in OLS (3) may be due to the small sample size for each treatment.  
35 The linear regression results for ex-ante experienced subjects are less clear and mainly non-significant. 
Regressions where the number of wrongly solved sudokus is the dependent variable are available upon 
request. 
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and its interaction with affirmative action and the ability proxy in order to see if 
different genders react differently to AA in our tournaments. Table 5 presents 
regressions OLS (5) and OLS (6) which are extended versions of OLS (1) and OLS (3) 
for experienced and non-experienced subjects respectively. They are supplemented by 
the interaction terms “AA*Gender”, “Pretest*Gender” and “AA*Gender*Pretest”. 
 
Table 5: Correct Sudokus, Affirmative Action and Gender 
 Experienced Non-Experienced 
 OLS (5) 
Dep. Var:  
# Correct Sudokus 
OLS (6) 
Dep. Var:  
# Correct Sudokus 
Const 10.50 
(5.34)* 
11.08 
(3.56)*** 
AA  4.42 
(6.51) 
 
-5.85 
(3.23)* 
AA*Pretest -0.78 
(1.33) 
2.89 
(0.73)*** 
AA*Gender 8.26 
(8.86) 
8.32 
(4.49)* 
AA*Gender*Pretest 1.84 
(1.92) 
-2.78 
(1.07)*** 
Pretest*Gender 1.31 
(1.57) 
3.26 
(0.80)*** 
Pretest 6.425 
(1.04)*** 
1.76 
(0.55)*** 
Gender 
(0=Male,1=Female) 
-3.77 
(7.07) 
-9.49 
(3.568)*** 
NK 2.72 
(2.50) 
-0.82 
(2.07) 
Year 12.03 
(1.64)*** 
3.64 
(1.19)*** 
Grade 3.30 
(0.72)*** 
0.29 
(0.67) 
# Observations 180 155 
Adj. R^2 0.650 0.680 
 Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Results for experienced subjects are not statistically significant. However, for 
non-experienced subjects we find significant gender effects in line with the existent 
literature, which may partially explain the low significance of results in regressions (3) 
and (4). Female subjects with low ability perform worse than men with equally low 
ability since the coefficient for “Gender” in OLS (6) is large, negative, and significant at 
the 1% level. However, this effect is reversed for females with higher ability. This can 
be seen from the fact that the coefficient “Pretest*Gender” is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. We also observe that the effect of AA is different for males and females. 
The coefficient for “AA” is negative and significant at the 10% level, implying that low 
ability non-experienced male subjects decrease their performance in the presence of 
affirmative action. However, since “AA*Pretest” is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, this effect is reversed in males as ability increases. The performance by females is 
enhanced under AA since the coefficient for “AA*Gender” is positive and significant at 
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the 10% level,  independently of the ability level since the significant coefficients at the 
1% level on “AA*Pretest” and “AA*Pretest*Gender” practically cancel out.36 Thus, we 
conclude: 
 
Result 4: Non-experienced females of low ability perform less well than comparable 
males as long as the asymmetry in experience is not corrected through affirmative 
action. High ability females perform better than comparable males. Once the 
disadvantage has been corrected, females improve their performance more than the 
males.  
 
Finally we look at how subjects’ expectations about winning their respective 
tournament are affected by affirmative action. After the tournament ended but before 
the participants knew the results, subjects answered a voluntary questionnaire which 
included questions about their individual perception of the probability of winning their 
respective tournament.37 As there was no information about the identity and 
characteristics of the respective opponent (with the exception of ex-ante experience in 
the AA treatments and in treatment K) we use these answers as a measure of confidence 
in winning. OLS (7) and (8) in Table 6 regress our measure of confidence in winning on 
“Pretest” and the treatment dummy for affirmative action (“AA”). Understandably, we 
find that high ability subjects have higher confidence in winning their respective 
tournament as “Pretest” has a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level. More 
importantly, we find that while for experienced subjects the presence of AA does not 
significantly affect reported confidence, it significantly increases the confidence of non-
experienced subjects at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the experienced 
subjects not feeling frustrated by the introduction of affirmative action while, at the 
same time, AA correctly increases the expectations of the non-experienced subjects of 
winning their respective tournament. 
 
                                                 
36 Similar regressions for separate AA treatments confirmed these results in the sense that all AA treatments had 
similar effects. The results for those regressions are available upon request. 
37 In the relevant question 6 (see Appendix) students could rank their expectation of winning the tournament against 
their respective rival on an ordinal scale from 1 (“Definitely”) to 5 (“Definitely Not”).  
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Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. One E subject and nine 
NE subjects did not respond to the questionnaire. 
 
Finally, regressions OLS (9) and OLS (10) show that while confidence is not 
gender specific for non-experienced subjects, experienced females report a significantly 
lower measure of confidence in winning than male subjects of the same ability. 
 
 
Table 6: Expected Winning Probability, Affirmative 
Action and Ability 
 Experienced Non-Experienced 
  OLS (7) 
Dep. Var.:  
Win Prob. 
OLS (8) 
Dep. Var.:  
Win Prob. 
Constant 2.49 
(0.21)*** 
2.43 
(0.18)*** 
AA -0.12 
(0.14) 
0.34 
(0.15)** 
Pretest 0.18 
(0.04)*** 
0.10 
(0.03)*** 
# Observations 179 148 
Adj. R2 0.086 0.069 
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    Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. One E subject and nine 
NE subjects did not respond to the questionnaire. 
 
4.3 The Effects of Affirmative Action on the Selection of Tournament Winners 
 
In the previous subsection we have shown that affirmative action has 
performance-enhancing effects on both experienced and non-experienced subjects. 
However, a question remains regarding the efficiency of implementing such policies 
from an ex-post point of view. As we have seen, AA increases the probability of 
winning for subjects who have an inherent disadvantage. Thus, those disadvantaged 
subjects who win their respective tournament may do so not because they perform better 
than their respective advantaged competitor but because now they receive 
compensation. As a result, the average performance of those subjects selected as 
tournament winners may be lower than the one we would have obtained had affirmative 
action not been implemented. However, given that in our tournament affirmative action 
had performance-enhancing effects, it is still possible that the comparisons with and 
without AA may not be clear cut.  
Table 7: Expected Winning Probability, Affirmative 
Action and Gender 
 Experienced Non-Experienced 
 OLS (9) 
Dep. Var.:  
Win Prob. 
OLS (10) 
Dep. Var.:  
Win Prob. 
Constant 2.00 
(0.31) *** 
2.37  
(0.23)*** 
AA -0.24 
(0.19) 
 
0.50 
(0.21)** 
 
Gender 0.69 
(0.43) 
 
0.16 
(0.36) 
 
AA*Gender 0.24 
(0.29) 
 
-0.34 
(0.31) 
 
Pretest 0.29 
(0.06)*** 
0.11 
(0.04)** 
 
Pretest* 
Gender 
 
-0.20 
(0.08)** 
-0.02 
(0.07)  
 
# Observations 179 148 
Adj. R^2 0.100 0.066 
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We start by showing that our affirmative action policies “leveled the playing 
field” at the aggregate level.  Table 8 records the percentage of tournaments winners 
from the NE school as a result of performing all possible pair-wise matches between 
competitors from both schools in each treatment.38 Notice that the percentage of NE 
tournament winners in the 4th grade (58.29%) is higher than in the 6th grade (45.81%), 
suggesting that the sizes of the compensations may have been a bit too high (low) given 
the performance of 4th (6th) graders. Comparing the NK and K treatments with the 
pooled AA treatments for the whole sample we observe that NE subjects change from 
representing roughly just 24% of the tournament winners when there is no affirmative 
action implemented (NK and K treatments) to roughly 52% when it is implemented. 
This difference is significant at all standard significance levels. 
As discussed in the introduction, one possible interpretation of our experiment is 
that AA may be used in order to select the individuals with highest underlying ability 
and, thus, we may not want ex-ante experience with the task to matter. Under such an 
interpretation the results of this subsection allow us to conclude that the AA policies 
implemented were reasonably successful in correcting the asymmetry and giving an 
equal chance to individuals of both groups to be selected. 
 
Table 8: Percentage of Non-Experienced  Tournament Winners by Treatment and School Year 
 4th Year 6th Year Overall 
NK 25 23.81 24.42 
K 21.27 27.27 23.94 
AA 58.29 45.81 51.81 
LH 83.42 57.14 72.32 
LL 49.51 10.49 31.84 
PH 61.43 55.03 58.40 
PL 40.27 53.68 45.96 
 
We now look at the average performance of all possible tournament winners by 
treatment and school year. Table 9 reports these averages with standard deviations in 
parenthesis. We find that both when separating by school year and when pooling all 
data (“Overall”), the average number of sudokus solved correctly by tournament 
winners is not lower in the AA treatments than in the NK. However, there exists a small 
negative difference when comparing the AA treatments with respect to the K 
                                                 
38 Note that the particular match used to reward subjects in our experiment was just one random 
realization of this process. 
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treatments, i.e. when looking at the effect of affirmative action on competitors who are 
aware of the existence of a disadvantage. 
 
Table 9: Average Correct Sudokus by All Possible Tournament Winners in Each Treatment and 
School Year 
 4th Year 6th Year Overall 
NK 30 
(13.541) 
42.04 
(15.52) 
35.81 
(15.71) 
K 31.83 
(11.62) 
46.91 
(13.03) 
37.75 
(14.23) 
AA 29.70 
(13.35) 
43.36 
(12.53) 
36.53 
(14.63) 
LH 28.20 
(11.98) 
42.91 
(12.58) 
36.22 
(14.31) 
LL 29.75 
(12.79) 
51.09 
(11.12) 
38.54 
(16.04) 
PH 27.94 
(11.00) 
41.30 
(12.80) 
33.90 
(13.56) 
PL 32.56 
(16.27) 
41.08 
(11.51) 
37.36 
(14.41) 
 
Note that since we are implementing all possible matches within each treatment, 
the sample size increases exponentially and thus statistical tests are now more powerful.  
Table 10 records the percentage change in these averages between treatments as well as 
Mann-Whitney tests comparing these differences. A negative sign indicates that the first 
treatment compared has a lower average than the second treatment compared. 
 
Table  10: Percentage Change of the Average Correct Sudokus by Tournament Winners 
 4th Year 6th Year Overall 
NK Vs. K -5.76** -10.38*** -5.14** 
NK Vs. AA 1.02 -3.05** -1.95* 
K Vs. AA 7.19** 8.17*** 3.36 
            Notes: * denotes significance differences at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Notice that when comparing the NK with the AA treatment, performance is in 
fact a significant 1.95% higher (at the 10% level) when affirmative action is in place 
and data from both school years are pooled. Performance decreases by a non-significant 
3.36% when comparing AA with K for the overall data. When comparing the data 
separating for different school years we maintain the conclusion that the average 
performance by tournament winners was higher in AA than in NK for 6th year subject 
but not significantly so for 4th year subjects. However, when we compare K with AA 
controlling for school year we find that there was a significant loss in each school year 
when AA was implemented (a loss of 7.19% for 4th year and a of 8.17% for 6th year). 
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This indicates that there was a loss in average performance although it was not large.39 
Thus we conclude: 
 
Result 5: While affirmative action policies induced a level playing field, they did not do 
so at the expense of a large loss in average performance by subjects selected as 
tournament winners.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the debate on the adequacy of affirmative action 
policies by presenting evidence on the effects in individual performance of 
implementing these policies in a tournament where capacities to compete are 
asymmetric. In particular, it shows that levelling the playing field by implementing AA 
leads to performance improvements by almost all participants and to a small decline in 
the average performance of selected winners.  
Our results thus imply that there are circumstances under which affirmative 
action policies are beneficial with respect to the incentives provided to all participants. 
Additionally, the negative effects of selecting worse performing but disadvantaged 
subjects are minimal.  
There are several issues that our design does not allow us to discuss. For 
example it is important to study how other relevant disadvantages not directly affecting 
capacities to compete may be affected by affirmative action. Similarly, the long term 
effects of using affirmative action have not been analyzed here. These issues are 
important and are left for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Notice that performance is a significantly lower 7% when comparing the performance by tournament 
winners under AA with respect to the hypothetical situation in which affirmative action was announced 
(such that the performance inducing effects are present) but then not used to select tournament winners. 
Notice that such policy, although more efficient from a performance point of view, may be difficult to 
justify and not credible in the long term.     
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9. Appendix 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
Below you can find a translation of the experimental instructions for one of the 
treatments (Experienced students in treatment PH). Other treatments’ instructions 
were identical, although changing the size and type of compensation. Complete 
instructions are available upon request. Instructions were originally written in 
Spanish. 
 
Pre-instructions 
     
Your Code: ___________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for participating. First, we are going to explain what you will be doing. You have to fill in grids with the 
numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
To do this you have to use the following rules: 
1. All boxes in a grid must be filled in with a number. 
2. The same number can appear only once in each column (vertical). 
3.  The same number can appear only once in each row (horizontal). 
4. The same number can appear only once in each square. Each grid is divided in 4 squares, marked in 
bold lines. 
5. In each grid all numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4  must be in each column, each row, and each square. 
  
Here are some examples: 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This column is completed wrongly                                         This column is completed correctly.  
because the 3 appears twice (rule 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This row is completed wrongly                                              This row is completed correctly.  
because the 4 appears twice (rule 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This square is completed wrongly                                               This square is completed correctly.  
because the 1 appears twice (rule 4) 
3 
1 
3 
4 
  
  
  
  
3
1
2
4
2 
 
 
 
4 3 4
  
  
  
2 4 3 1
4 
1 
 
 
1  
3  
  
  
4
2
1
3
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This is an example of a correctly completed grid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before starting you have 5 minutes to complete the following grids to check whether you have understood the rules. 
We will give you the correctly completed grids after the 5 minutes period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please remain silent and on your seat without disturbing anyone during the whole practice. 
 
Raise your hand after you have finished all grids and we will pick them up. 
 
Good luck! 
 
Instructions (treatment PH) 
 
Your Code: ___________________________________________ 
 
You are randomly matched with another student (your matched participant) from another school similar to yours, 
who is completing the same grids as you are. 
  
The students at the other school have NOT learned before how to solve those types of grids because it was 
NOT taught to them in their math classes. 
  
You have now 30 minutes time to complete as many grids as possible with the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the 
formulaires that we are now going to distribute. 
 
We will compare how many grids you have solved correctly with the number of correctly solved grids by your 
matched participant from the other school: 
  
- If you have correctly solved more grids then you will earn a 7 EU voucher that you can redeem in “La 
Casa del Libro”, where you can buy books, collector’s cards, toys, music or comics. 
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1 2 3
3 4 1
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- If you have correctly solved less grids then you will not earn the voucher. 
- If you have correctly solved the same number of grids  then a toss of a coin will be used to determine who 
earns the voucher. 
 
To compensate the other students for the fact that they have less practice than you we are going to give them 1 
grid more for each grid that they have solved correctly.  
 
For example: 
- If your matched participant correctly solves 12 grids, they count as 12 +12 = 24 grids. Therefore will earn 
the voucher if you solve correctly 25 grids or more. 
- If your matched participant correctly solves 30 grids, they count as 30 +30 = 60 grids. Therefore you will 
not earn the voucher if you solve correctly 59 grids or less. 
- If your matched participant scorrectly solves 20 grids, they count as 20 +20 = 40 grids. Therefore, if you 
solve correctly 40 grids, a toss of a coin determines whether you earn the voucher. 
  
The numbers of this example are chosen by chance and do not indicate how many grids a student can solve correctly.  
We would like to inform you that we have studied the results of other students of your age from other schools who 
completed the same grids: The maximum number of grids that somebody managed to solve correctly in 30 minutes 
were 81 grids and the minimum was 0 grids. On average the students completed around 25 grids correctly. 
 
Remember that only correctly solved grids count. 
 
Wait to turn the answer sheet until we tell you to do so. You have 30 minutes . Good luck! 
  
Your Code: ________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Final Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. How did you find today’s task? 
 
         Interesting         Entertaining          A bit long          Boring      
 
2. How many grids like these have you tried before? 
  
        None      Between 1 and 5    Between 6 and 20     Between 20 and 40    More than 40 
 
3. If you have tried solving grids like these before, where did you do it? _________ 
 
4. How many grids do you think you have solved correctly today? ______________ 
 
5. How many grids do you think your partner of the other school has solved 
correctly?_________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Do you think you are going to get the voucher? 
 
         Definitely    Probably yes      I don’t know  Probably not      Definitely not                       
 
7. Do you think it was a good idea to compensate the students of the other school that 
did not do grids like this before in school?   
 
         YES   NO 
 
8. The competition with the students of the other school from my perspective seemed to be:  
 
Fair     Rather Fair    A bit Unfair Unfair        Rather Unfair     Very Unfair 
 
9. Any other comment? __________________________________________________ 
 
 
